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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**

SECOM-D-174

24 June 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECOM Members

FROM:

[redacted]  
Chairman

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SUBJECT: Revision of DCID 1/14 re Off Duty Activities

1. Attached for your review and concurrence/comment is a proposed new paragraph 11 of DCID 1/14 to provide security policy guidance on off duty activities of persons holding or being considered for SCI access when those activities might conflict with security obligations. This responds to a request by members at the last SECOM seminar for language to cover this subject. The attachment has been agreed to by the SECOM Personnel Security Subcommittee. One item has been added to what they agreed to - a clause to cover situations involving social contact with Communist country nationals, such as [redacted] mentioned at the 29 May SECOM meeting with regard to the Washington Area International Junior Officers Organization.

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2. Members are requested to coordinate the proposed revision within their departments and agencies and to advise me no later than the 24 July 1985 SECOM meeting of their concurrences or comments.

[redacted]  
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Attachment: a/s

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**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
Security Committee**

**SECOM-D-176  
25 June 1984**

**MEMORANDUM FOR: SECOM Members**

**FROM:**

**25X1**

**Chairman**

**SUBJECT: Update of SECOM Harassments and Provocations Study**

1. Attached is a first draft of an update of the June 1982 SECOM Study of Harassments and Provocations. Anecdotal accounts in the attachment are sanitized summaries of classified and unclassified material submitted by Community departments and agencies in the spring of 1984. Please advise if the draft may properly be published at the unclassified (For Official Use Only) level as was the case with the 1982 study. Issuance at that level makes the study broadly useful for defensive briefings of a wide range of personnel, including dependents. Pending member responses on the classification issue, the attachment is tentatively marked Confidential.

2. It would be desirable to include more current material in the updated study, particularly items reflecting current experience in the Soviet Union now that Chernenko has come and gone and the Soviets seem less interested in detente. It would be especially useful if material could be provided on the experiences of travelers and tourists visiting Communist countries as well as on assignees. Please provide any additional material that can be included in the study.

3. Responses on the classification issue and current material should be provided the SECOM staff by 23 July 1985.

**25X1**

**Attachment  
As Stated**

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When Separated from Attachment**

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SOVIET UNION

Case 1

The Soviets continue attempted provocations against Americans in the USSR, apparently in attempts to entrap them in activities that can be treated as crimes against Soviet law or publicized to support claims that Americans are corrupt or immoral.

During a two-year tour in the Soviet Union, an American officer and his wife or traveling companion were routinely the subjects of attempts by Soviet nationals to engage them in questionable social relationships involving alcohol or women. When the Americans went to hotel restaurants, Soviet citizens would always be seated at their tables even if other tables were unoccupied. The officer avoided trouble by ignoring the Soviet offers to "socialize" and by limiting himself to polite conversation.

In early 1983, an aircrewman making an official trip to Moscow went to his hotel room. As he entered, one of two attractive women wearing European-style clothes started throwing him kisses. His room phone rang soon thereafter and a woman asked, in excellent English, "is Bill there?" He said "no." The caller then asked if she and her friend could come up for a drink and spend the night. He replied in the negative and hung up. About an hour later the woman called again, waking the crewman, and asking the same thing. The crewman asked if she was one of the women he had seen by his door earlier. She said she was, and stated that she and her friend were coming up. The crewman went back to sleep and had no further contact with the "friendly" women.

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**Case 2**

Taking photographs in the Soviet Union of anything other than officially approved subjects may well result in unpleasant consequences. In early 1982, a U.S. serviceman assigned in Moscow was visiting an open air market where Soviet farmers are permitted to sell ten percent of what they grow. He was photographing the colorful scene when a Soviet woman approached him and asked that he stop, as his photographs could "jeopardize their situation." (The private market is tolerated to varying degrees as a means of providing a more adequate diet, but is subject to restriction because it is inconsistent with Communist dogma.) The serviceman and his family then began walking back to their car when a Soviet male approached and ordered the American to follow him. The American told his family to return to their vehicle, and determined through questions that the Soviet male was a KGB agent. On the pretext of walking to a local militia station to resolve the matter, the American succeeded in running to his vehicle, locked the doors and drove away. While he suffered no repercussions from this incident, the KGB could easily have used it as an excuse for making things unpleasant.

**Case 3**

Soviet citizens, especially working class persons, are a volatile and unpredictable element for travelers, especially after having been indoctrinated on the need to protect their workplace and homeland against the "foreign threat." In late 1982, two U.S. officers touring the Soviet Union were forcibly restrained by a group claiming to be workers at a local factory. The workers searched one officer's pockets and shoulder travel bag, and forcibly seized a tourist camera. The other officer was physically restrained and separated from the other one. Both were physically assaulted for about a minute. By this time, about 20 to 30 persons surrounded the

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officers and threatened them with further physical abuse. The officers declared themselves as officials at the outset and presented diplomatic credentials. The "worker" who wrote up the report on the incident was recognized as one of the surveillants who followed the officers during the day.

In a similar case in 1984, a U.S. officer was assaulted in Leningrad by three Soviets as he left a restaurant. Soviet militiamen there made no effort to stop the attack. A month later, the official newspaper in Leningrad praised local citizens for apprehending U.S. officials who were allegedly "spying." The article was reprinted in another paper, and seemed designed to encourage private abuse against American officials.

**Case 4**

Trying to be a "wheeler-dealer" in the Soviet Union is asking for trouble. A U.S. officer assigned to that country, in violation of standing procedures, developed a social relationship with a late middle-aged Soviet. The American visited the Soviets' apartment, which was equipped with new furniture, a color TV, a VCR and a stereo component set. The Soviet explained his relatively high standard of living as the result of doing favors for contacts and friends who, in turn, did favors for him. Shortly before his scheduled departure from the USSR, the American asked his Soviet "friend" if he would like to purchase Western goods - some \$6,000 worth of used personal items, such as a TV, stereo, camera, watches and clothing. The Soviet said he was not interested but had an acquaintance who was. After discussing prices, a date and place was set for the "deal." While transferring the goods from his car to the vehicle of the "friend's" acquaintance, several Soviet militiamen arrested the American and the "acquaintance." The Soviet "friend" "escaped."

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The American was detained for six hours and interrogated at length without being permitted to call the American Embassy. Only after he refused the recruitment pitch was he allowed to call the Embassy. He was subsequently released to American diplomatic personnel.

**Case 5**

Doing things "your way" in the Soviet Union may result in unwelcome attention. In mid-1983 the wife of a U.S. serviceman assigned to a sensitive unit in Europe traveled to the USSR with a tour group. She was separated from the group and questioned extensively on what she did for a living and why she was in the Soviet Union. She was not asked about her husband or his duties. She was accused of stealing a towel from her hotel, which she denied strongly, and she was pointed out to customs officials by the tour guide, resulting in a thorough search and confiscation of some of her possessions.

She may have brought the harassment upon herself. She left the tour group so she could do some shopping. She pushed her way into a restaurant from which travelers were barred and had to be removed. Upon seeing what she thought was a radar site, she questioned the tour guide about it. The guide replied that it was an "observatory." The woman then started an argument by stating "I know a radar site when I see one."

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EASTERN EUROPE

**Case 1**

As in the USSR, some entrapment attempts are obvious. Two American officers traveling in Poland stopped for food in a hotel. Soon after being seated, two Polish men in their late 20s sat down with them, displayed large amounts of money, bought drinks, talked freely about Soviet missiles and offered sexual enticements. The Americans thanked the Poles for their hospitality, ignored their attempt to engage them in conversation on military subjects and their offer to find out "what a real Polish woman is like," and left the restaurant.

Consistent refusal of unsolicited overtures with sexual connotations will help visitors avoid entrapments and provocations. A U.S. officer traveling in Poland in the fall of 1983 was called in his hotel room several times late at night by a woman saying in broken English that she wanted to visit his room. He politely refused her overtures. Soon thereafter the woman came to his door seeking entry. The officer refused to let her in.

**Case 2**

Sometimes what seems like reasonable socializing can lead to unpleasant results. A U.S. officer traveling in Poland during the summer of 1983 checked into a hotel and went to the dining room to eat. He was seated with three men who acted as if they were having a celebration. After joining the others in a round or two of drinks, the officer attempted without success to order food. When he finally succeeded in getting a meal served, he became extremely and violently ill after taking a few bites. He was able to make it to his room and lock the door. One or more of his dinner companions knocked and sought entry immediately afterwards.

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**Case 3**

Attempted or claimed sexual encounters are used to plan blackmail scenarios. A U.S. officer assigned in Czechoslovakia was the victim of a harassment operation. A local national employee of the U.S. mission was contacted by a person claiming to have photographs depicting an illicit relationship between her and the officer. It was insinuated that the photos and details of the alleged relationship would be publicized unless both "parties" cooperated with Czech authorities. The employee told the American officer about this approach. Letters about the alleged relationship were later sent to the officer and his wife. They continued to be sent despite repeated diplomatic protests.

An American student of East European descent attending a university in Eastern Europe was contacted by the local security service and asked to cooperate in setting up a sexual entrapment scheme against a U.S. Marine embassy guard. The student was threatened with dismissal from his last year of medical school if he refused. He did refuse, was expelled from the university, and was the victim of a street assault before returning to the U.S.

**Case 4**

Frustration with a refused recruitment pitch apparently led Czech officials to stage an entrapment against an American official. The official, returning to Czechoslovakia after leave in a Western country, was waiting at the border to be processed. A Czech guard demanded access to the American's car. A package was promptly "discovered" under the floormat, and it was claimed that it contained hashish. The official was detained for several hours and only allowed to continue his journey after U.S. Embassy officials intervened. The American found himself thereafter under close, harassing

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surveillance and lost all his outside contacts until he left the country for reassignment.

**Case 5**

Marriage of a dependent to an East European national can bring hostile security pressure on the alien spouse. The son of a U.S. officer stationed in Eastern Europe married a local national in 1983. The new wife was questioned on several occasions about her marriage and her father-in-law's work. When the family began preparations for reassignment, the son sought permission for his wife to emigrate. She was again questioned and asked to cooperate in getting her husband to obtain information from his father. She refused. The U.S. officer noted increased surveillance thereafter. When the family left for their new assignment, the wife was allowed to leave with them.

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**CUBA**

Assignment to or travel to Cuba can result in unpleasant experiences.

**Case 1**

A Marine guard assigned to the U.S. Interests Section was in a restaurant at a popular beach when a Cuban began to insult him. The Marine extricated himself from a shoving match and left the building. On the street outside, a vehicle drove up and several local "militia" knocked the Marine down and injected him with an unknown substance which made him lose consciousness. American officials were later called by Cuban authorities. When they arrived and protested what had happened, the Cubans claimed the injection was necessary to control the Marine's violent behavior.

**Case 2**

Two dual nationality American servicemen traveled to Havana to visit relatives. While in Cuba, persons claiming to be from the "Immigration Department" took the passports from one of the servicemen and required him to come to what appeared to be a private house. There he found the other American being detained. The next day six Cubans arrived bearing a letter claiming that one of the servicemen and another person had come to Cuba to "harm the revolution." Their detention was explained as necessary while an investigation of the letter's claims was conducted. Both servicemen were released after 18 hours' detention. They were not questioned about their military duties, and were fed and allowed to make personal phone calls.

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**CHINA**

Reporting a theft to local authorities may result in being asked some tricky questions. An American official in China discovered valuable belongings missing from his hotel residence. After reporting this he was interviewed by the security service. A security official asked the American to list his local contacts as possible suspects for the theft. The American politely evaded this attempt to identify his sources by responding that the hotel staff were the only logical suspects. The interview was then closed.